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We study the community structure of networks representing voting on resolutions in the United
Nations General Assembly. We construct networks from the voting records of the separate annual
sessions between 1946 and 2008 in three different ways: (1) by considering voting similarities as
weighted unipartite networks; (2) by considering voting similarities as weighted, signed unipartite
networks; and (3) by examining signed bipartite networks in which countries are connected to
resolutions. For each formulation, we detect communities by optimizing network modularity using
an appropriate null model. We compare and contrast the results that we obtain for these three
different network representations. In so doing, we illustrate the need to consider multiple resolution
parameters and explore the effectiveness of each network representation for identifying voting groups
amidst the large amount of agreement typical in General Assembly votes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The study of networks has a long history in both the mathematical and social sciences [1], and recent investigations
have underscored their vibrant interdisciplinary application and development [2–7]. The large-scale organization
of real-world networks typically includes coexisting modular (horizontal) and hierarchical (vertical) organizational
structures. Various attempts to interpret such organization have included the computation of structural modules
called communities [8–10], which are defined in terms of mesoscopic groups of nodes with more internal connections
between nodes in the group than external connections to nodes in other groups. Such communities are not merely
structural modules but can have functional importance in network processes. For example, communities in social
networks (“cohesive groups” [11]) might correspond to circles of friends or business associates, communities in the
World Wide Web might encompass pages on closely-related topics, and some communities in biological networks have
been shown to be related to functional modules [12, 13].
As discussed at length in two recent review articles [8, 9] and references therein, the classes of techniques available
to detect communities are both voluminous and diverse. They include hierarchical clustering methods such as single
linkage clustering, centrality-based methods, local methods, optimization of quality functions such as modularity and
similar quantities, spectral partitioning, likelihood-based methods, and more. Investigations of network community
structure have been remarkably successful on benchmark examples and have led to interesting insights in several
applications, including the role of college football conferences [14] in affecting algorithmic rankings [15]; committee
assignments [16–18], legislation cosponsorship [19], and voting blocs [20] in the U.S. Congress; the examination of
functional groups in metabolic [12] and protein interaction [13] networks; the study of ethnic preferences in school
friendship networks [21]; the organization of online social networks [22], and the study of social structures in mobile-
phone conversation networks [23].
With the newfound wealth of longitudinal data sets on various types of human activity patterns, it has become
possible to investigate the temporal dynamics of communities, and this issue has started to attract an increasing
amount of attention [23–27]. It is also potentially useful to study community structure in similarity and correlation
networks [28], such as those determined by common voting or legislation-cosponsorship patterns [19, 20], alliances
and disputes among nations [29], or more general coupled time series [25, 26]. In such cases, one is faced with
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2numerous choices for how to actually construct the network from the original data—an important issue that has
received surprisingly little attention. (An old discussion of some of the available methods is presented in Ref. [30].)
In the present paper, we focus on this network construction issue by examining the community structure of networks
defined in different ways from roll-call voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
As discussed in a recent review [31], network analysis has lead to interesting insights in the field of international
relations—just as it has in numerous other fields in the social, physical, biological, and information sciences [1, 3, 4, 7].
For example, elements of the Correlates of War (CoW) data [32, 33] have been studied using network methods [29, 34],
and we expect that other available data will similarly admit profitable treatment. Previous studies of UNGA roll-
call data have been successful at grouping countries with Nominate scores, which assign ideological coordinates
to voting members and can be used to introduce partitions in policy space [35, 36]. Empirical investigation of
UNGA voting behavior has become readily accessible due to Voeten’s organization of the UNGA voting data [37].
Voeten analyzed this data using Nominate scores [36] to study Cold War and post-Cold War voting behavior [35].
Lloyd has analyzed similar data, using network and correspondence analysis to show that the so-called “Clash of
Civilizations” does not occur along civilizational lines but rather via a North-South division that arises from economic
differences (which she concludes has resulted in different levels of support for human-rights treaties) [38]. Motivated
by the previously-demonstrated utility of studying community structure in network representations of voting [20] and
legislation cosponsorship [19] in the United States Congress, we investigate in this paper the community structure of
network representations of the UNGA, based on the patterns of roll-call voting on resolutions, to see if such analysis
can help to identify and understand international voting blocs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give a brief introduction to the United Nations
General Assembly voting data and discuss the different ways that we will represent this data in the form of networks. In
particular, we construct (1) weighted networks defined by the numbers of voting agreements between pairs of countries;
(2) weighted, signed networks in which we separately consider voting agreements and disagreements between countries;
and (3) signed bipartite networks between countries and resolutions that directly indicates yes (+1) and no (−1)
votes. In Section III, we briefly review community detection via optimization of modularity and its generalizations,
emphasizing the use of appropriate null models with resolution parameters for each of the three kinds of network
representations that we consider. We then investigate community structure in the UNGA using each of these three
formulations and compare the results that we obtain. By analyzing the set of resolutions in each session according
to voting agreements between countries in Section IV, we are able to identify historical trends and changes in the
UNGA’s community structure. We then provide case studies by going into further detail in one session from each of
three different periods in the UNGA’s history. We investigate these three sessions (the 11th, 36th, and 58th Sessions)
in terms of voting agreements and disagreements in Section V and as bipartite networks with positive and negative
edges in Section VI. We close with concluding observations in Section VII.
II. NETWORK REPRESENTATIONS OF UNGA VOTING DATA
Unlike the other component bodies of the United Nations (UN), the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
provides equal representation to all member nations [39]. Each nation gets one vote, and UNGA representatives
can debate international issues and non-binding resolutions. In recent years, this setting has motivated collaboration
among less powerful, developing countries to create a “North-South” division. However, it is unclear how applicable
this grouping is in other settings or how cohesive it is on individual issues [35, 38, 40]. The voting record of UNGA
thereby provides an interesting application for the investigation of network community structure. The UNGA roll call
also provides a useful setting for testing the effects of different network representations of the data for determining
voting blocs, in part because one must pay particularly close attention to the baseline level of agreement that is
typical in UNGA resolutions that reach a recorded vote. This baseline tendency towards agreement in the data makes
the UNGA roll call different from, e.g., studies of roll-call voting and legislation cosponsorship in the United States
Congress [19, 20, 36, 41, 42].
The UNGA was founded in 1946. As indicated in Fig. 1, the number of member countries has increased steadily
since then, but the number of recorded votes varies from session to session. In this study, we consider every annual
session from 1946 to 2008 except for the 19th session (1964), which we exclude because voting occurred on only one
resolution in that session. We removed unanimous votes from the data, as they do not provide information about
the network structure of voting agreements and disagreements between countries. We also note the large amount of
agreement in UNGA voting, as illustrated in the right panel of Fig. 1, indicating the large fraction of “yes” votes
among the total set of votes cast. This bias towards agreement skews the simplest measures of voting similarity, so
an important area of investigation in the present paper is the consideration of such bias.
Within each session, we define edge weights between pairs of countries using a measure of the level of their voting
agreement. For example, Gartzke’s “The Affinity of Nations” data set [43] uses a well-known (in the international
3relations literature) diagnostic called “S” to measure the relative similarity between UNGA votes (S first converts
the voting information to column vectors and then calculates a similarity score between each pair of vectors), with
different calculations depending on whether one includes or omits abstentions [44, 45]. Assigning numerical values
to the types of possible votes—yes, no, abstain, and absent—requires choosing arbitrary relative magnitudes and
spacings between these values. For instance, one might assign ±1 to yes/no votes and choose some intermediate value
for abstentions and absences (and, of course, employ some argument as to whether an abstention should be interpreted
as closer to a yes or to a no vote, cf. similar discussions in Refs. [30, 35]). Contingency table statistics also provide a
possible way to measure the agreement between voting countries; they avoid the use of a numerical scale but instead
require one to assume an expected distribution of votes [30, 46].
Motivated by Lijhpart’s Index of Agreement [30], we define a unipartite network of voting similarities in which
the strength of connection between a pair of countries is given by the number of agreements on resolutions (yes-yes,
no-no, or abstain-abstain). To avoid assigning artificially high agreement scores to countries with low attendance,
we do not normalize by the number of times both countries were present and voting. (This contrasts with the norm
when studying voting in legislative networks such as the United States Congress [16, 20, 36].) One might instead
uniformly normalize counts of agreement by the total number of votes in a session, so that unit strength indicates
perfect agreement on all resolutions in a session. However, detecting communities on voting agreement networks
when using such a constant (in a session) normalization is equivalent to detecting communities on such networks
without the normalization. We therefore use the direct count of agreements as the weight of connections in the UN
voting agreement networks. We denote the (weighted, unipartite) adjacency matrix of such a network by A+ij , and we
ignore the artificial self-edges imposed by this definition of voting similarity by setting all diagonal entries equal to
zero. This is frequently done for correlation networks and is the standard procedure when studying voting similarities
[20, 25, 26, 47].
In contrast with a recent study of Congressional roll call networks [20], the preponderance of “yes” votes in the
UNGA (see Fig. 1) leads to a wealth of large weights in the voting agreement adjacency matrices A+ij , and many
of these weights are close to the total number of votes in the session. In this environment of significant agreement
in voting results, it is unclear how one should best treat abstentions without additional information that details the
causes for each such vote. In particular, the relative weight of disagreement between two countries in a yes-abstain
pair of votes on the same resolution should presumably be treated differently from that in a yes-no pair or in an
abstain-no pair. In order to include the possibility of treating some of these forms of disagreement differently, we
count the occasions of direct yes-no disagreement between two countries in the elements of the (symmetric) matrix
A−ij to supplement the A
+
ij agreement matrix. As we discuss in more detail in Section III, this will entail performing
community detection on signed adjacency matrices.
Finally, to ensure that we are not inappropriately discarding too much information about the particular votes on
which countries vote in agreement (or on yes-no disagreement), we will detect communities in a third class of networks.
Each such network (one per UNGA session) consists of a signed bipartite (two-mode) network of countries voting in
favor or against individual resolutions. That is, for each session, we will consider the adjacency matrix V that defines
a bipartite network between countries and resolutions that has both positive and negative links. Taking abstentions
as zero entries in the absence of other information, we define the matrix elements by
Vij =


1, if country i voted yes on resolution j
−1, if country i voted no on resolution j
0, otherwise (absences & abstentions).
(1)
A pair of countries that both vote yes constitutes an actual agreement on a proposed resolution, but there can be
multiple reasons for two countries to both vote against a resolution [30]. Importantly, the signed bipartite network
representation respects this asymmetry. It is intuitively clear that countries are more likely to have positive edges
to resolutions (i.e., yes votes) within their community, but only indirect improvements in group assignment can be
obtained by grouping together two countries with negative edges to a given resolution (i.e., no votes).
By investigating community structure in each of these three types of network representations—the A+ network
of agreements alone, the inclusion of both the A+ agreement network and the A− disagreement network, and the
underlying bipartite network V of votes on resolutions—we aim for a more complete and robust picture of the
communities present in the UNGA roll call than any one network representation might uncover by itself. More
generally, comparing and contrasting these approaches should provide valuable insight about the network treatment
of voting and correlation data.
4III. COMMUNITY DETECTION BY OPTIMIZATION OF GENERALIZED MODULARITY
We detect communities by optimizing the quality function known as modularity [48–50] and some of its generaliza-
tions. (Numerous other graph partitioning methods can of course be employed [8, 9].) We take the partition with the
highest quality value that we can obtain from among three computational heuristics—spectral bipartitioning [50, 51],
spectral tripartitioning [52], and the locally greedy “Louvain” method [53]—which we subsequently follow in each
case by Kernighan-Lin node-swapping steps [50, 54] in order find a partition of the network that has an even higher
value of the quality function. Of course, other heuristics (including other greedy methods, extremal optimization,
and simulated annealing) can also be employed [8, 9, 55]. Because modularity (and any similar quality function) has
a complex energy landscape that is expected to include a large number of good local optima, one must take care in
interpreting results when using it to study the community structure of real networks [56]. Additionally, modularity
optimization has a resolution limit [57], so it is important to include resolution parameters to investigate community
structure at multiple scales. Exploration of the resolution parameter space in each type of network representation is
a major focus of the present investigation.
In detecting communities by optimizing modularity (or its generalizations), one partitions a network so that the
strength of intra-community edges is optimized relative to a baseline expectation indicated by an appropriate null
model. The quality Q of a partition of the network is a function of the modularity matrix B = A − γP, where
the adjacency matrix A encodes the network, the matrix P encodes the null model, and incorporating a resolution
parameter γ allows one to identify communities at different scales [8, 9, 58]. The quality is given by
Q =
∑
i,j
Bijδ(ci, cj) , (2)
where δ(ci, cj) equals 1 if i and j have been assigned to the same community and 0 if they have been assigned to
different communities. (The quantity ck identifies the community to which node k has been assigned.) Finding the
community assignments that maximize Q is an NP-hard problem that requires the use of computational heuristics
to obtain a good local optimum [8, 9, 59]. Importantly, one must select a null model P that is appropriate for the
network under consideration. In particular, we need to use a different null model for each of the three different network
representations of UNGA voting that we consider (which we recall are the unipartite network of agreement between
countries, the unipartite signed network of agreements and disagreements between countries, and the bipartite signed
network of yes/no votes by countries on resolutions).
The unipartite network of agreements, encoded by A = A+, is the simplest case to consider. One can employ
the standard null model for modularity [49], Pij = kikj/(2m), where ki =
∑
j Aij is the strength of node i and
2m =
∑
i ki =
∑
ij Aij is the sum of all node strengths. The elements of the modularity matrix are then given by
Bij =
1
2m
(
Aij − γ
kikj
2m
)
. (3)
When γ = 1, equation (3) reduces to the standard definition of modularity [9, 49]. The standard null model for mod-
ularity describes the expected edge weight in an unsigned, unipartite random graph of independent edges, conditional
on having the same expected node strengths as those in the observed network. The standard null model is clearly
inappropriate for signed networks and bipartite networks, so other null models must be used instead. In the signed
case, the standard null model ignores the potentially important distinction between agreements and disagreements.
In the bipartite case, an appropriate null model must respect the constraint that each edge connects nodes of the two
different types.
Graphs with signed edges can be used to study social networks with both sympathetic (positive) and antagonistic
(negative) interactions [60]. This is potentially relevant, for example, for investigations of social balance [61]. A recent
paper introduced a generalization of modularity for signed networks and used it to study a network of international
alliances and disputes [29]. In our investigation, we include the A− representation of yes-no disagreements between
countries in addition to the A+ network of agreements. Recall that the absence of agreements indicated in A+ might
include unpaired abstentions or full yes-no disagreement, but we include only the latter of these in the specification
of A− (with such disagreements encoded as A−ij > 0 elements), providing an opportunity to weight their effects more
heavily. Using the signed null model developed in Ref. [29], the modularity matrix becomes
Bij =
1
2m+ + 2m−
(
A+ij −A
−
ij − γ
k+i k
+
j
2m+
+ λ
k−i k
−
j
2m−
)
,
where k±i =
∑
j A
±
ij are the signed strengths for node i and 2m
± =
∑
i k
±
i =
∑
ij A
±
ij are the corresponding total
edge weights of the network’s two kinds of edges. In using two different resolution parameters for agreements and
5disagreements, one can investigate and separately vary the effects of these two different types of connections on the
community structure. In particular, the resolution parameters separately control the expected extent of communities
considered along the two kinds of edges (see, e.g., the Laplacian dynamics interpretation of this signed null model in
Ref. [27]).
To detect communities in each signed bipartite voting matrix V, we need to generalize the bipartite modularity
of Ref. [62] to incorporate both positive and negative edges. A bipartite network consists of two types of nodes—
countries and resolutions—and each edge connects a node of one type to a node of the other. The matrix V encodes
connections between countries and resolutions. Ordering the nodes according to type, with all countries ordered before
the resolutions, the corresponding modularity matrix B in bipartite form consists of off-diagonal blocks:
B =
[
0 B˜
B˜
T
0
]
. (4)
Recalling our definition of V with elements {0,±1} encoding yes and no votes, the non-zero components of B then
become
B˜ij = Vij − γ
k+i d
+
j
2m+
+ λ
k−i d
−
j
2m−
, (5)
where k±i and d
±
j , respectively, denote the positive and negative degrees for country i and resolution j, and 2m
± =∑
i k
±
i =
∑
j d
±
j gives the total number of positive [(+) superscript] and negative [(−) superscript] connections in the
network.
Having described the three network representations of the voting record that we will consider, we are faced with the
dilemma of setting values for the resolution parameters γ and λ. Given some theoretical justification for expected or
desired group sizes, one might reasonably study the partitions obtained for specific resolution values. In the absence
of any such additional political information, we will instead explore the space of possible resolutions. In so doing, we
will focus on communities that appear robustly across a range of resolution parameter values.
IV. NETWORKS OF VOTE AGREEMENTS
We first consider the weighted, unipartite UNGA networks that we constructed by considering the level of agreement
between counties. We maximize Newman-Girvan modularity, which is given by equation (3) with γ = 1, for each of
the UNGA sessions. In addition to its use for community detection, modularity can also be used as a measure of
polarization among the voting parties [19, 20].
In Fig. 2, we show that beginning near the 1964 declaration of the Group of 77 (G77), the fraction of maximum
modularity captured by partitioning on the basis of G77 membership tends to increase over time. In Fig. 2, we also
present the calculated modularity for the two-group G77 partition (G77 members versus non-members [66]) for each
session. Observe in particular a recent sharp rise in modularity in the Post-Cold War era, with a larger fraction of
modularity corresponding to this G77 split. In the right panel of the figure, we show the sizes of the communities that
we found by optimizing the Newman-Girvan modularity in each session, demonstrating that we typically find a small
number of large communities. Prior to the end of the Cold War, this dominant split appears to be along an East-West
axis, which we identified by tracking the identity of specific countries (e.g., comparing the placement of the UK and
the USSR). In contrast, in the Post-Cold War sessions, the two-community split appears to be along a “North-South”
axis, illustrating the cooperation between developing countries in the dominating North-South division of the UNGA
[38, 40] (again, e.g., with the UK typically in the North). In Tables I and II, respectively, we list the countries that
were consistently assigned to the communities labeled North and South in Sessions 46–63 (1991–2008). In Table II,
representing the South, Mexico is the only non-member of the G77 (it left the organization in 1994). In Table I,
representing the North, the Marshall Islands is the only member of the G77 [63].
Because one has to be careful with modularity’s resolution limit [57], we will examine these observations more
carefully in single-session case studies by incorporating resolution parameters and the more sophisticated null models
described above. In examining the UNGA community structure over time, we consider three key eras: the early years
of the Cold War (Sessions 1–25; 1946–1970 ), a transitional period (Sessions 26–45; 1971–1990 ), and the post-Cold
War era (Sessions 46–63; 1991–2008 ). We consider one case study from each era—Sessions 11, 36, and 58—and start
by optimizing modularity using the null model from equation (3) over a large range of resolution parameter values
γ, starting roughly from where the network begins to split up and ending when we obtain a set of communities that
consist of individual countries. We seek regions of resolution parameters with identical or very similar community
partitions, which then suggests that we have detected robust mesoscopic features of the network [8, 9, 25, 58, 64].
The sizes of such regions can also potentially provide hints about the extent of such robustness. To find meaningful
6values of γ, we track changes between the numbers of communities obtained at neighboring parameter values and
seek large regions (that is, plateaus) in which the network is partitioned into the same number of communities. We
also quantify changes between neighboring partitions using the Jaccard distance, although other quantities can also
be used [8, 22]. We show the Jaccard distance between neighboring values of γ for Session 11 in the top left panel of
Fig. 3.
In order to assist in the visualization of common associations, we sorted the UNGA member countries using the
community assignments in the network partitions. In the bottom left panel of Fig. 3, we illustrate the communities
that we obtained for Session 11. We find a large region (.8 ≤ γ . 1) of two-community partitions that differ only in
the placement of five countries (Finland, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Japan). The persistent orange community in
this γ range is the “East” group of countries, and the persistent yellow group of countries is the “West”. Increasing the
resolution parameter splits the Western community into several much smaller communities (including some consisting
of individual countries), leaving a small core bloc (see Table III) of countries stably placed together for γ up to and
including the observed plateau at γ ∈ (1.353, 1.388). Countries in the core group inside the Western bloc agree more
with each other than they do with the rest of the Western bloc. Meanwhile, the Eastern community splits into two
subgroups (Table III lists the country names in each of these groups): a group voting “no” on 43% of the resolutions
(and abstaining on 10% of them) and another voting “abstain” on 34% of the resolutions (and voting “no” on 9%
of them). The group of countries that votes “no” also has fewer agreements with the West than the countries in the
“abstain” group.
Although the community sizes drop off faster with resolution parameter in Session 36 and Session 58 (see, respec-
tively, the middle and right parts of Fig. 3) than they do in Session 11, we again find a dominant two-community
region (0.8 ≤ γ . 1) for both sessions. For Session 36, we list the countries in the Eastern bloc and Western bloc
communities in Table IV. Session 36 also has a small plateau with three communities for γ just above 1. In Session 58,
the dominant two-community split divides countries into North and South groups (as indicated previously at γ = 1),
and we similarly find a small plateau in which the network is partitioned into three communities for γ just above 1.
After these communities split up with a further increase of γ, we do not find any plateaus of reasonable size that
correspond to network partitions with more communities, and only one group of countries appears to remain robust
across this γ range (the North group listed in Table V).
V. NETWORKS OF VOTE AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS
In this section, we study the signed unipartite networks that we obtain by treating the expected number of positive
and negative edges in the network separately. As indicated in Section III, this yields a null model with two terms and
a resolution parameter (γ and λ) for each of them. Using the network of agreements and disagreements described
in Section II, we sweep over different values of the two resolution parameters and plot surfaces for the numbers of
communities in Fig. 4. In these plots, we have color-coded the surface by the mean Jaccard distances between each
partition and its nearest neighbors in resolution parameter space. That is, given the square grid of sampled resolution
parameter values that we explore, each partition is compared with its four nearest neighbors.
In this two-dimensional parameter space, one can no longer easily visualize all of the community assignments at
each resolution parameter value. Because we seek robust community assignments, we avoid parameter values at which
the number of communities (the height in the left panels of Fig. 4) change rapidly. In order to ensure similarities in
nearby partitions (cf. the weaker restriction of the same numbers of communities), we calculate the Jaccard distances
between the partitions obtained at nearest-neighbor points on a square grid in the (γ,λ) plane, with both dimensions
discretized by 101 uniform points, (γ, λ) ∈ [0, 2]. We have color-coded the left panels of Fig. 4 at each grid point by
the mean Jaccard distance between that partition and its four nearest neighbors. We then selected points on this
grid by hand to correspond to community assignments that persist over a range of resolution parameter values (we
indicate these in the figure). For each of our three case studies (Sessions 11, 36, and 58), we show the number of
communities and mean Jaccard distance at the selected points in resolution parameter space. In Fig. 4, we have also
tabulated the resolution parameter values and the partitions that we found at the selected points in parameter space.
In agreement with the results in Section IV, we recover the dominate two-way split in the UNGA that spans a large
portion of the parameter space. Again as before, we find some smaller robust groups at multiple regions in parameter
space. Observe in Sessions 11 and 58 (and to a smaller extent in Session 36) that some communities of moderate and
even large size persist robustly even when the other countries are partitioned by themselves or as members of tiny
communities. We identify these countries for Session 11, 36, and 58 in Tables VI, VII, and VIII, respectively.
7VI. BIPARTITE VOTING NETWORKS WITH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EDGES
In this section, we use the signed bipartite modularity from Section VI to study networks of yes and no votes, which
we represent using positive and negative edges between UNGA countries and the resolutions on which they voted. (We
do not include abstentions in this network.) As before, we seek robust communities by exploring the two-dimensional
space of resolution parameter values and examining the number of communities and mean Jaccard distances between
partitions obtained at nearest-neighbor resolution parameter values on a uniform grid. The Jaccard distances that
we used for the partitions of the bipartite voting network were calculated with respect to the full bipartite network
(rather than restricted to the partitions of countries).
We show the results of our numerical exploration of the signed bipartite network representations in Fig. 5. A major
difference between our results for these networks and those of the previous sections is that community detection on the
bipartite network of votes additionally includes UNGA resolutions in the groups with the countries that predominantly
supported such families of resolutions. We find that each of the three case-study sessions contains numerous resolution
parameter values, identified in Fig. 5, in which there are large, robust communities (as we also saw with the other
network formulations). Session 11 contains resolution parameter values in which one of these two robust communities
is much larger than the other one. Sessions 36 and 58 both contain regions in which there is one dominant community
that contains almost every country. In contrast to the other network formulations, we note there do not appear to be
any robust plateau regions in the γ > 1 values in Fig. 5 (cf. the results illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4). Instead, each of
the robust partitions identified in Fig. 5 consists of two large groups with only a small number of countries assigned to
additional groups. While these partitions differ from one another across the resolution parameter landscape, many of
the community assignments remain the same across these selected points, with the right edge of the figure identifying
groups of countries that are placed together at all of the selected resolution parameter values. In Tables IX, X, and XI,
we list for Sessions 11, 36, and 58, respectively, the countries that appear robustly in the larger groups identified in
the far right edge of Fig. 5.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have studied the community structure of networks formed by voting on resolutions in individual
sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. The UNGA voting record provides a fascinating example of a very
general problem: How can one use network methods such as community detection to examine data such as voting
records? Accordingly, our focus is not on attempting a sociological or political study of the UNGA but rather on
using it as an interesting and potentially valuable example to consider different network frameworks that are each
seemingly reasonable and then comparing the results that one can subsequently obtain from them. To do this, we
constructed networks from the UNGA voting records of sixty-three separate sessions between 1946 and 2008 in three
different ways: (1) by considering voting similarities as weighted unipartite networks in the usual manner, (2) by
considering voting similarities as weighted unipartite networks in a manner that takes the large extent of agreement
of the General Assembly into account, and (3) as signed bipartite networks in which countries are connected to
resolutions. For each formulation, we detected communities by optimizing network modularity using an appropriate
null model. In optimizing a quality function such as modularity, the consideration of multiple resolution parameters
enables one to examine different “background” levels of agreement between nations.
In Fig. 6, we compare the community detection results that we obtained partitioning the countries using these
different network representations on each of our selected “case study” sessions of the UNGA (Sessions 11, 36, and 58).
We consider modularity-optimizing partitions of the network of agreements at two different values of the resolution
parameter (γ1 = 1 and γ2 > 1; see the figure caption for the values of γ2 in each session) and illustrate the robust
groups that we identified across the selected indexed points in the resolution parameter spaces of the signed, unipartite
representation and the signed, bipartite representation (restricting the latter to the identified groups of countries,
ignoring the grouping of the resolutions). For each network representation, we find a dominant voting pattern that
includes two large communities corresponding to majority and minority groups. We observed this for each of the three
UNGA sessions in our case studies. This split appears most clearly for partitions obtained by modularity optimization
of the network of agreements at the standard resolution parameter value γ1 = 1 (first column) and those obtained
by modularity optimization of the bipartite networks (fourth column). Additionally, one can see (by comparing the
two blocks in the first column) small and medium-size cores of groups in the network of agreements that persist for
resolution parameter value γ2 > 1. For all three sessions, we find such core groups in the second column that arise
from each of the large communities in the first column. In each of the three case-study sessions, a large portion of these
core communities remain intact when considering networks of both agreements and disagreements (third column).
These observations appear to be consistent with the expected East-West split of the Cold War and the North-South
division of recent sessions that has been described by social scientists using qualitative methods [38].
8In principle, the bipartite network representation would seem to be the best for any investigation of voting, as
it contains the complete record of votes cast on resolutions. However, in comparing the identified communities of
countries, we observe that the most predominant groupings of the countries also appear prominently when considering
the other network representations. Moreover, in our examples, community detection on the bipartite voting network
tends to only return large groups—with few partitions seemingly stable at higher resolution parameter values—
whereas the other network representations uncovered a more diverse set of stable groups, including small groups of
countries, complementing the information in the large-group partitions. These differences illustrate the importance
of considering multiple network representations in the investigation of voting networks and, more generally, that it is
crucial to be cognizant of multiple possible network representations when applying such methods.
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TABLE I: 39 Countries partitioned in the “North” community consistently in Sessions 46–63 (cf. Fig. 2).
Albania Estonia Israel Marshall Islands Spain
Armenia Finland Italy Netherlands Sweden
Australia France Japan New Zealand Turkey
Austria Germany Latvia Norway Ukraine
Belgium Greece Liechtenstein Poland United Kingdom
Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania Portugal United States of America
Canada Iceland Luxembourg Romania Western Samoa
Denmark Ireland Malta South Korea
TABLE II: 84 Countries partitioned in the “South” community consistently in Sessions 46–63 (cf. Fig. 2).
Afghanistan Chile Guinea Maldives Qatar Trinidad and Tobago
Algeria China Guyana Mali Rwanda Tunisia
Angola Colombia India Mauritius Saudi Arabia Uganda
Bahrain Comoros Indonesia Mexico Senegal United Arab Emirates
Bangladesh Congo Iran Morocco Sierra Leone Venezuela
Belize Costa Rica Jamaica Mozambique Singapore Vietnam
Benin Cote DIvoire Jordan Myanmar Sri Lanka Yemen
Bhutan Cuba Kenya Namibia St. Lucia Zambia
Bolivia Djibouti Kuwait Nepal Sudan Zimbabwe
Botswana Ecuador Laos Nigeria Surinam
Brazil Egypt Lebanon North Korea Swaziland
Brunei El Salvador Lesotho Oman Syria
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Libya Pakistan Tanzania
Cameroon Gabon Madagascar Peru Thailand
Cape Verde Ghana Malaysia Philippines Togo
TABLE III: Countries in the two large robust groups of the Session 11 voting agreement network (which we highlight in Fig. 3
using dashed lines).
Western Core Community Eastern Community
“No”-Voting Community Abstaining Community
United Kingdom Poland Yugoslavia Morocco
Netherlands Hungary Libya Sudan
Belgium Czechoslovakia Egypt Syria
Luxembourg Albania Lebanon Jordan
France Bulgaria Saudi Arabia Yemen
Portugal Romania Afghanistan India
South Africa Russia Myanmar Sri Lanka
Israel Ukraine Indonesia
Australia Belarus
New Zealand
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TABLE IV: Countries in the two large robust groups of the Session 36 voting agreement network (which we highlight in Fig. 3
using dashed lines).
Western Community Eastern Community
USA Canada UK Cuba East Germany
Guatemala Paraguay Belize Poland Hungary
Ireland Netherlands Belgium Czechoslovakia Albania
Luxembourg France Spain Bulgaria Russia
Portugal West Germany Austria Ukraine Belarus
Italy Greece Turkey Seychelles
Sweden Norway Denmark Mongolia
Finland Iceland Malawi Vietnam
Israel New Zealand Australia Laos
Japan Afghanistan
TABLE V: Countries in the large robust group of the Session 58 voting agreement network (which we highlight in Fig. 3 using
dashed lines).
North Community
United States of America Canada United Kingdom
Ireland Netherlands Belgium
Luxembourg France Monaco
Liechtenstein Switzerland Spain
Andorra Portugal German Federal Republic
Poland Austria Hungary
Czech Republic Slovakia Italy
San Marino Malta Albania
Macedonia Croatia Yugoslavia
Bosnia-Herzegovina Slovenia Greece
Cyprus Bulgaria Moldova
Romania Estonia Latvia
Lithuania Georgia Finland
Sweden Norway Denmark
Iceland Turkey Israel
South Korea Japan Australia
New Zealand Marshall Islands Palau
Federated States of Micronesia
TABLE VI: Countries in the robust groups of the Session 11 network of voting agreements and disagreements (see Fig. 4).
1 2 3
Yugoslavia United Kingdom Poland
Morocco Netherlands Hungary
Libya Belgium Czechoslovakia
Sudan Luxembourg Albania
Egypt France Bulgaria
Syria Portugal Romania
Jordan South Africa Russia
Saudi Arabia Israel Ukraine
Yemen Australia Belarus
Afghanistan New Zealand
India
Indonesia
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TABLE VII: Countries in the robust groups of the Session 36 network of voting agreements and disagreements (see Fig. 4).
1 2
United States of America German Federal Republic German Democratic Republic
Canada Italy Poland
United Kingdom Norway Hungary
Ireland Denmark Czechoslovakia
Netherlands Iceland Bulgaria
Belgium Israel Russia
Luxembourg Japan Ukraine
France Australia Belarus
Portugal New Zealand Mongolia
TABLE VIII: Countries appearing in the single robust group of the Session 58 network of voting agreements and disagreements
(see Fig. 4).
Canada Spain San Marino Bulgaria Denmark
United Kingdom Andorra Malta Moldova Iceland
Ireland Portugal Albania Romania Turkey
Netherlands Germany Macedonia Estonia South Korea
Belgium Poland Croatia Latvia Japan
Luxembourg Austria Yugoslavia Lithuania Australia
France Hungary Bosnia-Herzegovina Georgia New Zealand
Monaco Czech Republic Slovenia Finland
Liechtenstein Slovakia Greece Sweden
Switzerland Italy Cyprus Norway
TABLE IX: Countries in the three largest robust groups of the Session 11 bipartite network (see Fig. 5). We grouped resolutions
(not listed) with these countries via community detection on the signed bipartite network of countries and resolutions.
1 2 3
Poland Finland United States of America Bolivia Sweden
Hungary Ethiopia Canada Paraguay Norway
Czechoslovakia Morocco Cuba Chile Denmark
Albania Tunisia Haiti Argentina Iceland
Bulgaria Libya Dominican Republic Uruguay Liberia
Romania Lebanon Mexico United Kingdom South Africa
Russia Jordan Guatemala Ireland Iran
Ukraine Saudi Arabia Honduras Netherlands Turkey
Belarus Afghanistan El Salvador Belgium Israel
India Nicaragua Luxembourg Taiwan
Myanmar Costa Rica France Pakistan
Sri Lanka Panama Spain Thailand
Nepal Colombia Portugal Laos
Cambodia Venezuela Austria Philippines
Indonesia Ecuador Italy Australia
Peru Greece New Zealand
Brazil
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TABLE X: Countries in the four largest robust groups of the Session 36 bipartite network (see Fig. 5; resolutions not listed)
1 2 3 4
Guatemala Canada Bahamas Cuba Guinea-Bissau Algeria
Spain Ireland Dominican Republic Haiti Gambia Libya
Austria Netherlands Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago Mali Sudan
Greece Belgium Belize Barbados Senegal Iran
Finland Luxembourg Honduras Grenada Benin Iraq
Sweden Portugal Costa Rica St. Lucia Mauritania Syria
Malawi Italy Colombia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Guinea Lebanon
Norway Bolivia Antiqua and Barbuda Burkina Faso Jordan
Denmark Paraguay Mexico Sierra Leone Saudi Arabia
Iceland Chile Nicaragua Ghana Arab Republic of Yemen
Japan Uruguay Panama Togo Peoples Republic of Yemen
Australia Equatorial Guinea Venezuela Cameroon Kuwait
New Zealand Cote DIvoire Guyana Nigeria Bahrain
Liberia Surinam Chad Qatar
Congo Ecuador Congo United Arab Emirates
Swaziland Peru Uganda Oman
Morocco Brazil Kenya Afghanistan
Turkey German Democratic Republic Tanzania Mongolia
Myanmar Poland Burundi India
Nepal Hungary Rwanda Bhutan
Cambodia Czechoslovakia Somalia Pakistan
Singapore Malta Djibouti Bangladesh
Papua New Guinea Albania Ethiopia Sri Lanka
Solomon Islands Yugoslavia Angola Maldives
Fiji Cyprus Mozambique Thailand
Western Samoa Bulgaria Zambia Laos
Romania Zimbabwe Vietnam
Russia Botswana Malaysia
Ukraine Madagascar Philippines
Belarus Comoros Indonesia
Cape Verde Mauritius
Sao Tome & Principe Seychelles
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TABLE XI: Countries in the two large robust groups of the Session 58 bipartite network (see Fig. 5; resolutions not listed)
1 2
Canada Greece Bahamas Senegal Lesotho Myanmar
St. Vincent & the Grenadines Cyprus Cuba Benin Botswana Sri Lanka
St. Kitts-Nevis Bulgaria Haiti Mauritania Swaziland Maldives
Guatemala Moldova Dominican Republic Niger Madagascar Nepal
Argentina Romania Jamaica Cote DIvoire Comoros Thailand
United Kingdom Russia Trinidad and Tobago Guinea Mauritius Cambodia
Ireland Estonia Barbados Burkina Faso Morocco Laos
Netherlands Latvia Dominica Sierra Leone Algeria Vietnam
Belgium Lithuania Grenada Ghana Tunisia Malaysia
Luxembourg Ukraine St. Lucia Togo Libya Singapore
France Armenia Antiqua and Barbuda Cameroon Sudan Brunei
Monaco Georgia Mexico Nigeria Iran Philippines
Liechtenstein Finland Belize Gabon Egypt Indonesia
Switzerland Sweden Honduras Central African Rep. Syria Papua New Guinea
Spain Norway El Salvador Congo Lebanon Vanuatu
Andorra Denmark Nicaragua Dem. Rep. of Congo Jordan Fiji
Portugal Iceland Costa Rica Uganda Saudi Arabia Nauru
German Fed. Rep. Sao Tome & Principe Panama Kenya Arab Rep. of Yemen Tonga
Poland Equatorial Guinea Colombia Tanzania Kuwait
Austria Chad Venezuela Burundi Bahrain
Hungary Turkey Guyana Rwanda Qatar
Czech Republic Tajikistan Surinam Somalia United Arab Emirates
Slovakia Uzbekistan Ecuador Djibouti Oman
Italy Kazakhstan Brazil Ethiopia Afghanistan
San Marino South Korea Bolivia Eritrea Turkmenistan
Malta Japan Paraguay Angola China
Albania Australia Belarus Mozambique Mongolia
Macedonia New Zealand Azerbaijan Zambia North Korea
Croatia Solomon Islands Cape Verde Zimbabwe India
Yugoslavia Kiribati Guinea-Bissau Malawi Bhutan
Bosnia-Herzegovina Tuvalu Gambia South Africa Pakistan
Slovenia Western Samoa Mali Namibia Bangladesh
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (Left) Numbers of countries (blue) and resolutions (red) in each numbered annual United Nations General
Assembly session during 1946–2008 (Session 1 occurred in 1946, etc.). (Right) Fractions of votes cast in each numbered annual
session in favor (“yes”), against (“no”), and abstaining.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) (Left) Maximum modularity obtained by partitioning the (unipartite) voting similarity network of each
session. For comparison, we also show the modularity of the partition into G77 and non-G77 countries, revealing the increasing
fraction over time of modularity that can be explained by this division of the network. Observe the sharp increase after the end
of the Cold War. (Right) Communities in each UNGA session that we identified using the network of voting similarities. We
labeled the dominant countries geographically in each session by tracking the identities of specific countries (e.g., the United
Kingdom is typically West in every session during the Cold War and in the North group after the Cold War). We list the
countries assigned to the North and South communities are in Tables I and II, respectively.
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FIG. 3: (Color) Results of community detection in UNGA Sessions 11 (left), 36 (middle), & 58 (right) by optimizing the
modularity in (3) for the network of voting similarities. (Top) Number of communities (Nc; blue) that we obtained at each
value of the resolution parameter γ and the Jaccard distance (green) between partitions obtained at neighboring values of γ
(which differ by ∆γ ≈ 0.007, 0.002, and 0.003, respectively). (Bottom) Community assignments at each value of γ; we use
color to visualize each community, and we sort countries vertically by their community assignments across γ. In Table III,
we indicate the three groups of countries in Session 11 countries that are grouped together robustly: the Western core of
communities who are commonly grouped together (1) and an Eastern community containing subgroups of Abstaining countries
(2) and “No”-Voting countries (3). In Table IV, we indicate the two groups of countries that appear robustly across this range
of resolution parameter values for Session 36; given the identities of the countries, they can be labeled as a Western Community
(4) and an Eastern Community (5). In Table V, we similarly identify a robust group of countries as a “North” community (6).
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FIG. 4: (Color) Exploration of the resolution parameter space for the signed, unipartite network of countries in Sessions 11
(top), 36 (middle), and 58 (bottom) of the UNGA. (Left) Number of communities identified at each pair of resolution parameter
values, which we have color-coded according to the mean Jaccard distance between the partition and its four nearest neighbors
in the space of resolution parameters. (Center) Resolution parameter values in different stable regions (selected by hand) of
the resolution parameter space. (Right) Color-coded visualization of the communities that we obtained at each indexed point
in resolution parameter space, with an additional column (far right) that color-codes the blocks of countries and resolutions
that are grouped together robustly at all of the indexed partitions.
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FIG. 5: (Color) Exploration of the resolution parameter space for the signed, bipartite network of countries and resolutions
in UNGA Sessions 11 (top), 36 (middle), and 58 (bottom). (Left) Number of communities that we identified for each value
of the pair of resolution parameters. We have color-coded these plots using the mean Jaccard distance (which we computed
for the full bipartite network) between the partition and its four nearest neighbors in resolution parameter space. (Center)
Resolution parameter values for different stable regions in the resolution parameter space (selected by hand). (Right) Color-
coded visualization of communities that we obtained at each indexed point in resolution parameter space. The far right column
color-codes the blocks of countries that are grouped together robustly at all of the indexed partitions.
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FIG. 6: (Color) Comparison of the robust groups that we obtained by community detection for each network representation
for each of our three case studies of UNGA sessions: (Top) Session 11, (middle) Session 36, and (bottom) Session 58. For each
session, we use a color-coding to visualize the robust groups. In particular, we compare (1) the partition that we obtained by
modularity optimization at default resolution (γ = 1) in the network of voting similarities; (2) the partition that we obtained
by modularity optimization of the same network at resolution parameter values of γ ≈ 1.360 (Session 11), γ ≈ 1.180 (Session
36), and γ ≈ 1.259 (Session 58) [each of these values is near the respective right edges of the ranges plotted in Fig. 3]; (3) the
robust groups that we identified across the indexed points in resolution parameter space in the signed, unipartite representation
of voting agreements and disagreements (Fig. 4); and (4) the robust groups of countries that we identified across the indexed
points in resolution parameter space in the signed, bipartite network of votes (see Fig. 5).
